Rawls and talents

What does it mean to be "more talented" in the context of Rawls's theory? As Nozick remarks (in a footnote of his discussion of Rawls' Theory - in Anarchy State and Utopia), "most talented" individuals just means, in the contexts of Rawls theory, those who are able to produce a larger economic output or who happen to be able to trade their work more favorably or to obtain social positions connected to the highest responsibilities and powers. The most talented should not be conceived to be such "from birth". Nothing must count as a talent absolutely - prior or independently from institutional arrangements. It follows that it is the ongoing scheme of cooperation that establishes whether some quality (or lack of it), say, the ability to speak backwards, or physical strength, corresponds to a talent (or lack of it). "Being talented" is a predicate that has a meaning only relative to a social arrangement.

I will now determine some properties that some quality must have in order to be a talent in a society that is just (according to Rawls). That is I will determine a necessary condition for something to be a talent in a Rawlsian society. A society is just, according to Rawls, if its basic structure (the main institutions that govern the distributions of social advantages and burdens) satisfies the following criteria:

1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with
the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political
liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair
value.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent
with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity.

The principle of fair equality of opportunity (b) says that:

Those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. More specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in
the social system.

On the basis of these two principles, we can define conditions that something must satisfy to count as a talent within a just society (a Rawlsian talent):

Being good (or bad) at F counts as a Rawlsian talent (or the lack of one) only if

institutions I [which ensure that people who have F and who make the same efforts to cultivate and use F have the same chance to end up occupying social positions connected to similar powers and prerogatives] belong to a scheme of institutions SI such that
- SI guarantees the basic liberties; and
- all the inequalities SI allows go to the advantage of the worst off representative individuals of that society;

That is to say, being good (or bad) at F counts as a Rawlsian talent (or the lack of one) only if the institutions ensuring equal chances to occupy social positions to those with equal talents and efforts are part of a regime of institutions in which social inequalities connected to social positions go to the advantage of the worst off (that is, a society in which no inequality could be eliminated without making the prospects of the worst off members even worst) and in which the basic liberties are respected.

What determines whether some trait which satisfies this necessary condition is eventually a talent, that is a good trait? The answer is: the free decisions of the people living within just institutions. A sufficient and necessary condition for a trait to count as a Rawlsian talent could therefore be the following:

F is a Rawlsian talent iff

the having of F by an individual is positively correlated to F's owner occupying offices and positions attached to responsibilities and powers, in a society governed by a scheme of institution SI where:

- people who have F and who make the same efforts to cultivate and use F have the same chance to end up occupying social positions connected to similar powers and prerogatives
- SI guarantees the basic liberties; and
- SI does not produce any inequality that could be eliminated without reducing the life-prospects of the least better-off members of society

This leads to the following three reflections:
first reflection
second reflection
third reflection