Tuesday, August 28, 2007

equal opportunity for goods and equality of goods for which people are not responsible

Susan Hurley has pointed out that the following two notions are equivalent:


equal opportunity for goods = equality of goods for which people are not responsible

". Perhaps the end of luck egalitarianism is not equality of goods for which people are not responsible, but rather equality of opportunity for goods. However, if these are equivalent, the above argument from ends to means still holds. Are they equivalent? I suggest that they are, and my argument for this suggestion is my reply to this objection. Roemer calls his interpretation of luck egalitarianism ‘equality of opportunity’, which is one expression of the choice exemption, in the way I have just explained. 16 However, let us consider the relationship between equality of goods for which people are not responsible and equality of opportunity for goods in more general terms, to see why they are equivalent."
"Background and context: the talented choice dilemma"
In Sypnowich, Christine. The Egalitarian Conscience - Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press. 28 August 2007
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199281688.001.0001>

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